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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforce-
ment level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential
game where individuals, who di¤er in their willingness to pay for a taxed
good, vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and
choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper
that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade-o¤: more
enforcement increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of
the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market.
We obtain that the equilibrium enforcement level is the one most-preferred
by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not a¤ected
by the structure of the market (number of rms) and the rmsmarginal
cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the
tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting
with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by
assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement
level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails
full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of mar-
kets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that
tax rates are not tailored to each market individually.
Key words: Tax evasion, imperfect competition, majority voting, inter-
mediate preferences.
JEL Codes: D43, D72, H26, H32.
1 Introduction
In many countries, indirect taxation raises a large fraction of aggregate tax
proceeds. Evasion of indirect taxes such as VAT is then a crucial problem
governments have to deal with. Nam, Parsche and Schaden (2001) present
estimates for VAT evasion1 inside the European Union, between 1991 and
1993: their gures vary from 2.4% in the Netherlands to 20.2% in Greece,
22.6% in Spain and 34.5% in Italy (see also Keen and Smith (2007) and
European Commission (2009)). In developing countries, these estimates are,
on average, higher: 29.6% for Argentina (AFIP (2008)), 35.3% for Mexico
(Hernández Trillo and Zamudio (2004)), and 54.8% for Guatemala (SAT
(2007)).
Tax evasion is a¤ected among other things by enforcement policies. Such
policies vary widely across countries. According to OECD (2009), the Aus-
tralian Taxation O¢ ce (ATO) audits 8% of VAT registrants each year, com-
pared to 20% for Her Majestys Revenue & Custom (HMRC) in the UK.
Also, maximum sanctions for fraudulent reports di¤er signicantly between
these two countries: penalties may reach 50% of the amount of evaded tax
in Australia, against 100% in the UK. Although less public data is available,
there is also evidence that tax enforcement varies across economic sectors
within a given country. According to the French Cour des Comptes (2010),
law, nance, insurance and health services rms were almost never audited
in the Rhône-Alpes-Bourgogne region between 2003 and 2007. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that in Argentina, the provincial Agencia de Recaudación
de Buenos Aires (ARBA) does not audit VAT compliance of vegetables and
meat retailers.
Cremer and Gavhari (1993) has shown that social optimality may call
for di¤erences in indirect tax enforcement policies between countries, or be-
tween economic activities in a given country. But the low aggregate enforce-
ment level or the almost inexistent verications in some economic sectors
can hardly be explained by the normative theory of indirect tax enforcement
policies. One possible explanation has been conjectured by Sandmo (2005, p.
660). He concludes his recent overview of the tax evasion literature by stating
that One perspective on tax evasion and the hidden economy that merits
more attention is that of positive political economy. (...) It is also of major
1The gures represent estimations of amounts evaded, as percent of the potential VAT
revenue, i.e. the revenue that would be obtained with full compliance.
1
interest to achieve a better understanding of the political and economic forces
that determine the policies that we actually observe. It is, e.g., not obvious
that the low degree of enforcement of the tax law in some sectors or countries
is entirely due to cost considerations; it may also be because the electorate
is actually against attempts to achieve a higher rate of compliance.
The objective of this paper is precisely to provide a political economy
analysis of why indirect tax enforcement levels vary across markets, and
especially of why enforcement is low in certain markets.2 We assume that
individuals vote over the enforcement level, anticipating perfectly the impact
of their choice on market equilibrium. Voters face the following trade-o¤:
more enforcement increases tax collection (and thus the amount of a uniform
lump sum transfer) but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold
in an imperfectly competitive market.
To our knowledge, and in accordance with Sandmos statement above, the
political economy determination of tax enforcement when rms evade indirect
taxes has not been studied in the literature so far. More precisely, our paper
constitutes a link between two strands of research. First, many articles deal
with tax evasion by rms, under di¤erent market structures. Marelli (1984),
Wang and Conant (1988) and Yaniv (1995) consider a risk-averse monopolist
deciding simultaneously how much to produce and to evade. In particular,
Yaniv (1995) presents the rst rigorous analysis of the necessary conditions
under which production is independent from evasion. Virmani (1989) and
Cremer and Gahvari (1993) present models of risk-neutral rms that evade
taxes under perfect competition. Virmani (1989) was the rst to introduce
concealment costs, as a way to reconcile the conventional framework with
risk-neutral rms with Alligham and Sandmo (1972)s paradigm of evasion
under uncertainty. Marelli and Martina (1988), Goerke and Runkel (2006)
analyze these same decisions in an imperfectly competitive environment. The
papers closest to our are Bayer and Cowell (2006) and Goerke and Runkel
(2011) who both study two-stage Cournot models, with risk-neutral rms
deciding upon output and evasion while facing the risk of being audited.
All these papers either concentrate on describing the equilibrium (evasion
and production) behavior of rms and on performing a comparative statics
analysis, or look at the rmss decisions from a normative perspective. None
2By low or weak enforcement, we mean that little enforcement is taking place at equi-
librium, and not necessarily that the equilibrium enforcement is lower than its optimal
level.
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of these papers adopt a positive approach to enforcement decisions.
Our paper is also related to a very recent literature on political economy
models of tax enforcement. These papers study majority voting over linear
income taxes when tax evasion is possible. Their main objective is to un-
derstand how the equilibrium income tax rate is a¤ected by the presence of
tax evasion. Roine (2003) and Traxler (2006) stress that the decisive agent
is the one with the median taxed income, who may di¤er from the individ-
ual with the median before-tax income if tax evasion opportunities are not
monotone in pre-tax income. Borck (2004) shows that stricter enforcement
may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The
presence of tax evasion may have a more drastic impact on the identity of the
decisive voter and on the tax rate chosen by majority voting. Roine (2006)
shows that introducing tax evasion may transform the classical conict be-
tween rich and poor (where the median income individual is decisive) into an
ends-against-the-middle situation where a coalition of poor and rich agents
favor higher income tax rates. Borck (2007, 2008) shows that allowing for tax
evasion may result in the non existence of a majority-voting income tax rate
(because individual preferences over the tax rate are neither single-peaked
nor single-crossing when tax evasion is introduced).
Our paper links these two strands of literature since it studies majority
voting over the enforcement level when rms may evade indirect taxes.3 We
consider a continuum of individuals characterized by their willingness to pay
for a good which is subject to a sales tax. Since we focus on the determination
of the enforcement level, we assume for most of the paper that the tax rate
is set at an exogenous level and we solve the following three-stage model. In
the rst stage, individuals vote over the tax enforcement level. In the second
stage, the good is produced in an imperfectly competitive market, where rms
compete à la Cournot. In the third stage, rms report to the government the
amount of their sales. Firms decide either to conceal a fraction of their sales
(at a resource cost) or to fully comply with the tax law, knowing that they
will be audited and, if found to have evaded, penalized. In order to explain
why equilibrium enforcement may be low, we bias the model in favor of full
enforcement by assuming that governments audits are costless and perfect.
We solve the model backwards. In the last stage, each rm evades the
same fraction of their sales. This fraction increases with the tax rate, de-
3From now on, we refer to these taxes as sales taxes, but our analysis applies equally
well to VAT.
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creases with the enforcement level but is independent of market variables such
as the price of the good or the number of rms in the market. Anticipat-
ing this, in the second stage, rms compete à la Cournot. The equilibrium
price depends positively upon the level of enforcement. Finally, we study
the voting equilibrium at the rst stage and we show that the equilibrium
enforcement level corresponds to the one preferred by the consumer with
the median willingness to pay. Performing the comparative static analysis
of this level (assuming isoelastic demand functions) allows us to study its
determinants, and to shed some light as to why this level may di¤er across
markets. Surprisingly, we obtain that rmsmarginal cost and market struc-
ture (the number of rms) have no inuence on the equilibrium enforcement
level. Enforcement is also negatively correlated with the resource cost of eva-
sion and with the value of the tax rate. We also show that the comparison
between majority chosen and socially optimal enforcement levels does not
depend only on the distribution of willingness to pay (i.e., it is not simply a
matter of comparing the median with the average willingness to pay).
We also study the simultaneous determination of the tax rate and of the
enforcement level. We prove the existence of a majority voting equilibrium,
even though the voting space is bidimensional. We show that the decisive
voter should set the enforcement level high enough to discourage any tax
evasion. In other words, the existence of low enforcement at equilibrium cru-
cially depends on the fact that the tax rate is not chosen simultaneously by
majority voting. We show how the chosen tax rate depends on the distri-
bution of willingness to pay and on demand elasticity. We also show that,
in our model with no redistribution motives (quasi-linear preferences) and
no government revenue requirement, the socially optimal tax rate should be
zero.
Our positive approach may be criticized on two accounts. First, one can
object that people do not vote directly over enforcement levels. Direct ma-
jority voting is the simplest way to aggregate citizens preferences over the
enforcement level. Any political economy mechanism (such as elections, lob-
bying, etc.) with the Condorcet winning enforcement level as equilibrium
would give the same results as our simpler approach. Also, the enforcement
level may be considered as a short-cut for more complex institutional deci-
sions related to the e¢ ciency of the tax authority (for instance, persistence
of corrupt inspectors and lack of human or physical capital). Second, we
concentrate on the demand side (consumers) while the supply side (rms)
does not try to inuence policy. An alternative approach would consider the
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supply side. We show below that prot is decreasing in enforcement in our
symmetrical setting, so that rmsowners would vote/lobby against enforce-
ment. A political-economy explanation of the di¤erences in enforcement
levels across markets would require heterogeneity of rms across markets.
One route would be to study why it may be easier for rms to overcome the
free-riding problem associated with lobbying in certain markets. One could
then apply the results of Le Breton and Salanié (2003), and obtain that it
is easier to lobby (and obtain a lower enforcement level) in markets where
rms are heterogeneous. Another route would be to assume that some rms
evade while others do not, so that some rms could actually benet from
enforcement because it would tilt the playing eld in their favor.4 We leave
this alternative approach to future research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the model. Section 3 shows the equilibrium. Section 4 compares
the voting equilibrium with the utilitarian optimal. Section 5 presents some
comparative statics. Section 6 tackles the simultaneous determination by
majority voting of the tax rate and the enforcement level. Section 7 studies
various extensions to our model. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Individuals
There is a continuum of individuals of measure 1. Each individual has two
sources of income: an exogenous endowment w and a uniform lump sum
transfer G from the government. Individuals choose how much to consume
of two goods, labelled 1 and 2. The price of good 1 is normalized to unity
whereas the consumer price of good 2 is p. We denote by x and q the
quantities bought of good 1 and 2, respectively: Individuals are characterized
by ; their willingness to pay for good 2. The parameter  is distributed
according to density f() with cumulative distribution F () on [; ]: We
denote the average value of  by  and its median by med. Utility of
individual  is
U = x+ u (q) ; (1)
4We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these alternative explanations.
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where the function u is strictly increasing and concave, verifying the Inada
conditions.5
Individual  takes the lump sum transfer G as given and chooses the
quantity q that maximizes his utility (1) subject to the individuals budget
constraint
x  G+ w   pq: (2)
The rst-order condition6
u0 (q) = p
denes q (p), the demand for good 2. Aggregate demand for good 2 is given
by
Q(p) =
Z 

q (p) f () d:
2.2 The industry
We do not explicitly formalize the market for the numeraire good. Good 2 is
produced by n identical, risk neutral rms labelled i = 1; :::; n: The number
of rms is exogenous, so that we cover all situations, from monopoly (n = 1)
to perfect competition (n ! 1). Each rm i simultaneously decides how
much to produce (qi): Firms have constant returns to scale technologies, with
the same marginal cost c > 0: Given output decisions (q1; :::; qn); the price
adjusts to the level that clears the market. We denote by p(Q) the inverse
market demand, where Q =
P
i qi is aggregate output. The function p(Q) is
twice-continuously di¤erentiable, with p0 (Q) < 0 at all Q.
Each rm i has to pay a sales tax at a constant proportional rate 0 <
 < 1:We assume that the sales amount pqi is private information, and that
taxes due are computed based on the amount of sales reported by the rm.
We denote by ei 2 [0; 1] the fraction of sales that rm i fails to report. If
ei = 0; the rm fully complies with the tax law. But if ei > 0; we say that
there is tax evasion. We follow Cremer and Gahvari (1993) by assuming that,
5This approach, where individuals di¤er in their willingness to pay for a good and are
endowed with a quasi-linear utility, is standard in the industrial organization literature.
Observe that our results would not be a¤ected if endowments were heterogeneous across
individuals. In section 7 we discuss how our results would change if preferences were not
quasi-linear and agents had di¤erent incomes, which is the framework often used in public
economics.
6We assume that each individuals exogenous endowment is large enough so that the
amount consumed of good 2 satises this rst-order condition.
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in order to be successful, concealment of the fraction ei entails a cost of g(ei)
per $ of sale.
We assume the following functional specication
g(ei) = k
e2i
2
;
where the parameter k  1 reects the (in)e¢ ciency of the evasion technol-
ogy.7
We assume that prots are distributed to unmodelled non-resident agents.
We come back to this assumption in sections 4 and 7.
2.3 The government
The government audits each rm i with the same probability a 2 (0; 1).
When a rm is not audited, it pays sales taxes based on the amount reported
i.e., it pays (1  ei)pqi:We assume that audits are costless and perfect, so
that the government identies the true sales amount of audited rms with
certainty. Observe that this assumption biases the model in favor of high
or full tax enforcement while our objective is to explain how equilibrium
enforcement may be low. If under-reporting of sales is detected, the evading
rm has to pay the tax that it legally owes, pqi plus an additional ne,
which is a fraction  > 0 of the amount of taxes evaded: Our modelling is
in line with the US legislation - see Skinner and Slemrod (1985). With all
revenues collected (taxes and nes), the government nances the provision
of the lump sum transfer G.
2.4 Timing
Up to section 6, we assume that the tax rate has been set at the exogenous
rate of  before the beginning of the game. The timing of the game we study
runs sequentially as follows.
1. Individuals vote over the level of tax enforcement.
2. Firms compete à la Cournot in the market.
7Our results would carry through with a generic increasing and convex concealment
cost function satisfying g(0) = 0. Our functional specication allows to perform more
easily comparative statics analysis.
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3. Firms decide the fraction of sales to report.
4. The government audits rms, collects taxes and nes due and nances
the lump sum transfer out of the total tax and nes proceeds.
The assumption that rms decide the fraction of sales to report after
having competed in the market is made for expositional convenience: all our
results would carry through if the output and evasion decisions were taken
simultaneously (or if evasion decisions were carried rst).
In section 6, we endogenize  and analyze the simultaneous determination
of the tax rate and the enforcement level.
3 Equilibrium of the model
As is usual, we solve the game backwards. As the last stage is purely me-
chanical and involves no optimization, we start with the penultimate one.
3.1 Evasion
In stage 3, each rm i chooses the level of evasion ei that maximizes its
expected prot
Ei = aAi + (1  a)NAi ; (3)
where
Ai = [p (Q) (1  (1 + ei)  g(ei))  c]qi
and
NAi = [p (Q) (1  (1  ei)  g(ei))  c]qi:
denote ex-post prots when rm i is (respectively, is not) audited. Therefore,
expected prot is
Ei = [p(Q)(1  (1  ei(1  ))  g(ei))  c]qi;
where  = a(1 + ) denotes the expected payment rate on undeclared sales
tax, expressed as a proportion of the tax rate  . From now on,  will be our
measure of tax enforcement.
The following rst-order condition
@Ei
@ei
= [(1  )  g0(ei)]p(Q)qi = 0
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characterizes the optimal fraction ei in case of an interior solution. Through-
out the paper, we denote equilibrium values of variables with a . At an in-
terior optimum, each rm declares a fraction of sales such that the marginal
expected net benet from evading this fraction equals the marginal cost of
concealing it. Observe that ei is independent of the market structure (the
number of rms n), of the rmscost c and of the variables determined in
the market (price and quantities).8 Moreover, as all rms are audited with
equal probability, they all evade the same fraction of sales taxes. From now
on, we save on notation by eliminating the subscript i each time a variable
has the same value for all rms. Using the functional form adopted for the
concealment costs function, we obtain an explicit solution for the optimal
evaded share e. We gather the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When  < 1; each rm fails to report a fraction of sales
e = (1   )=k: This fraction increases with the tax rate  and decreases
with enforcement  and with the ine¢ ciency of the evasion technology k.
When   1; no rm evades.
In order to evade, a rm must face an expected rate of payment on un-
declared sales that is lower than the tax itself. If this is not the case, there
is no evasion at equilibrium.
We now move to the second stage of the game.
3.2 Market competition
Substituting the optimal evasion share e into the expected prot function
(3) we obtain
Ei = [p (Q) (1   e   g(e))  c] qi;
where  e denotes the e¤ective tax rate paid by rms. The legal tax rate 
is modied by incorporating the evasion decision and the expected ne paid
on the amount evaded:
 e = (1  e(1  )):
Observe that
 e + g(e) =    
2(1  )2
2k
<  when  < 1;
8Cremer and Gahvari (1993) obtain the same independence result.
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so that evasion allows rms to increase the fraction of their sales that they
retain. Straightforward di¤erentiation shows that
@ e
@
=  [ e|{z}
Enforcement e¤ect
  @e

@
(1  )| {z }
Evasion e¤ect
] > 0:
The e¤ective tax rate increases with enforcement through two channels: a
direct enforcement e¤ect (that increases the expected payment rate on
undeclared sales) and an indirect evasion e¤ect(that decreases the fraction
of sales undeclared).
Each rm chooses qi in order to maximize its expected prot, taking as
given the decisions of all other rms j 6= i. The rst-order condition for rm
i is given by
@Ei
@qi
= [1   e   g(e)] [p (Q) + p0 (Q) qi ]  c = 0;
from which we see that, in order to obtain an interior solution, p(Q) +
p0(Q)qi > 0. Existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium are en-
sured if we also assume
@2Ei
@qi@qj
= [1   e   g(e)] [p0(Q) + qip00(Q)] < 0; i 6= j;
i.e., the marginal revenue of rm i is decreasing in any other rm js produc-
tion (see Vives (1999)). With this assumption, the second-order condition
@2Ei=@q
2
i = [1   e   g(e)][2p0(Q) + p00(Q)qi ]  0 automatically holds.
Since rms are identical, the equilibrium production decisions qi are the
same. We sum the rst-order conditions over the n rms and obtain
[1   e   g(e)] [np (Q) + p0 (Q)Q] = nc:
This equality implicitly denes the equilibrium aggregate output Q:9 Divid-
ing by p and rearranging, we nally obtain
p   ~c
p
=
1
n
; (4)
9As the market equilibrium is symmetric and both the number of rms and the pre-
vailing price are observable, the tax authority could in theory infer sales per rm and thus
whether evasion has taken place. We assume that audits are necessary to prove evasion
i.e., although sales can be infered in equilibrium, evasion is not veriable unless audits
are commissioned.
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where p = p(Q);  is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of demand
and
~c =
c
1   e   g(e) : (5)
Equation (4) is the usual inverse-elasticity rule, where ~c represents the e¤ec-
tive marginal cost paid by rms. It is easy to see that ~c > c when  > 0 and
that ~c increases with  and with : taxation is equivalent to an increase in
the marginal cost faced by the rm, but evasion allows to dampen in part
this impact. As is intuitive, p increases with ~c: Observe that a more compet-
itive industry (i.e., a larger value of n) results, other things equal, in a lower
mark-up over the marginal cost ~c, but does not impact this marginal cost.
Since Q and thus p are continuous functions of the enforcement parameter
, straightforward use of the implicit function theorem allows us to obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When  < 1; the equilibrium price p increases with the
enforcement level : When   1; p is independent of :
As mentioned above, evasion helps rms attenuate the impact of taxation
on their marginal cost. Hence, with evasion, the consumer price is lower
than the level that would have prevailed with full compliance. Therefore,
the higher the enforcement, the lower the evasion and thus the higher is the
equilibrium price level.
3.3 Voting over the tax enforcement level
We are now in a position to solve for the rst stage decision, by majority
voting, of the tax enforcement level . Making use of the individuals budget
constraint (2) and of the equilibrium price (4) into the utility function (1),
we obtain the indirect utility10 of individual  :
V = w   pq(p) + u (q(p)) +G: (6)
One way to prove the existence of a Condorcet winning value of  (i.e.,
a value of  that is preferred by a majority of citizens to any other value)
10Recall that rms prots are distributed to non-residents. Alternatively, we could
assume that rms owners are resident but that they represent a set of measure zero
without a¤ecting this sections results.
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consists in checking that individual preferences described by equation (6)
satisfy the single-crossing property in the (;G) space. Using the envelope
theorem, we obtain that the marginal rate of substitution in the (;G) space
is given by
MRS(;G) =   @V=@
@V=@G
= p0()q(p) > 0:
Intuitively, since more tax enforcement increases the consumer price of the
good, agents have to be compensated with a larger transfer.
Indi¤erence curves are single-crossing since
@MRS(;G)
@
= p0()
@q(p
)
@
> 0 if  < 1;
= 0 if   1:
The intuition for this result is straightforward: since higher  individuals
consume more of the good, they need more compensation following a tax
enforcement-induced price increase (except if the enforcement is already so
high that it has no impact on the price anymore).
We then apply the median voter theorem (see Gans and Smart (1996))
and obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 The Condorcet winning tax enforcement level, denoted by ^,
corresponds to the preferred level of enforcement of the individual with the
median value of .
We denote by () individual s preferred value of , so that ^ =
(med). Using an envelope argument, 
() is given by the following rst-
order condition:
 p0()q(p) +G0() = 0: (7)
The rst term describes the impact of an increase in  on individual s
expenditure, through an increase in p: Expenditure in good 2 increases,
which is detrimental to the individuals utility. The second term shows the
impact on G; and is obtained by di¤erentiating the governments budget
constraint:
G =  epQ(p): (8)
Equation (8) shows that tax proceeds G can be expressed as the product of
two terms: the e¤ective tax rate  e and the actual value of sales, pQ(p).
Therefore, an increase in the enforcement level  has two e¤ects on the value
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of G: First, the e¤ective tax rate increases, as explained in section 3.2. Sec-
ond, due to the change in p; the actual value of sales changes. One can
surmise that the elasticity of demand will play a crucial role in determining
the sign of this second impact.
Observe that condition (7) does not require G to be globally concave in
, but that it implies that G0() > 0 at () i.e., we are on the upward
sloping side of the La¤er curveG(). This is intuitive, since increasing tax
enforcement has the drawback of increasing the consumer price p, and is
thus only palatable to consumers if it increases the lump sum transfer that
they receive.
We know from Milgrom and Shannon (1994, Theorem 4) that the single-
crossing property implies that the most-preferred enforcement level is mono-
tone with respect to ; so that
sgn(
@()
@
) = sgn( p0()@q(p
)
@
) < 0; (9)
i.e., individuals with a higher willingness to pay (who consume more of the
good than individuals with a weaker taste for the good, at any given price)
favor less tax enforcement as a mean to decrease the equilibrium price of the
good.
4 Normative analysis of the voting equilib-
rium
We now compare the tax enforcement level chosen by majority voting, b; with
the level that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner. It is important
to keep the timing of the game unchanged to do a proper comparison: the
value of  is chosen at the rst stage and then the game proceeds in the same
sequence as previously. We adopt the usual utilitarian denition of welfare,
given by
W = w +
Z 

[u (q(p
))  pq(p)]f()d +G;
where G is given by (8). Observe that we do not include rmsprots in our
denition of welfare. We do this in order not to bias the comparison with
the tax enforcement level chosen by majority voting, since individuals do not
take prots into account when voting. We rationalize this formulation by
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assuming that prots are paid to the non-resident owners of the rm. We
come back to this assumption in section 7.
We prove the following proposition in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 The optimal enforcement level opt is lower than b if the de-
mand of the med individual, qmed(p
(^)); is larger than the average demand,
Q(p(^)): Otherwise, the opposite relationship between ^ and opt occurs.
Observe that the comparison between equilibrium and optimum enforce-
ment levels hinges on the di¤erence between the demand of the median type
qmed and the average demand Q (rather than the demand of the average
individual q). The intuition for this Proposition is straightforward once we
recall from (9) that individuals with a larger willingness to pay (and thus
a larger demand) prefer a lower enforcement level in order to bring down
the price of good 2. The identity of the type with the average demand is of
course endogenous to the model, and may depend upon other determinants
than the distribution function F (such as, for instance, the price elasticity of
demand). We then need to introduce functional forms in order to draw more
specic results.
5 Comparative static analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of changes in parameters of the model
upon the enforcement levels b and opt. There are three reasons why such
an exercise is meaningful and relevant. First, it allows to obtain testable
implications, for instance on which variables a¤ect the fraction of sales taxes
evaded, which is the measure on which the empirical literature has focused
(see Introduction). Second, it allows to compare equilibrium and optimum
enforcement levels/fractions of sales tax evaded, shedding light on which
markets may exhibit too much or too little (from a social viewpoint) evasion.
Last but not least, it allows us to answer the main question raised by this
paper: why is it that certain markets exhibit less enforcement than others?
To perform this comparative static analysis, we need to impose functional
forms. From now on, we restrict ourselves to utilities given by
u (q) =
q1 
1   ; (10)
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where 1= > 0 denotes the constant (absolute value of the) price elasticity of
demand. We report in the Appendix the individual and aggregate demands,
as well as the equilibrium price.
Using equation (8), the rst-order condition (7) that characterizes the
(interior) equilibrium  of an individual of type  can be written as
epQ(p)
26642 + (1  1=) ~cc e| {z }
A
 ~c
c


M
1=
| {z }
B
3775 = 0; (11)
or alternatively as
() = 1 
vuuutk


M
1=
+ (1 + 1=)    2

(1=)  2
; (12)
where M denotes the type with the average demand. The Condorcet winning
enforcement level b corresponds to (med); while the optimal level opt is
given by (M):
We rst study the comparative statics of the variables which do not a¤ect
M nor med. The sign of their impact on b and opt is the same, according
to (12).
Proposition 5 Assume that individual utilities are isoelastic. The majority
chosen and the optimal enforcement levels depend neither upon the marginal
cost c nor the number of rms n: Both enforcement levels always decrease
with the ine¢ ciency of the evasion technology k, and also with the tax rate
 when the demand elasticity 1= is lower than one.
To understand this proposition, recall from (7) that () balances the
marginal impact of the enforcement level on the individuals expenditures
(term B in (11)) and on the governments transfer (term A in (11)). Both
the marginal cost c and the number of rms n impact only the amount of sales
evaded. Since this amount plays the same multiplicative role with respect
to both e¤ects A and B in (11), they do not a¤ect (). The impact of
the evasion cost k is more interesting. The sensitivity of the price p to 
increases with k, which increases the impact of  on type s expenditure and
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calls for a smaller most-preferred . On the other hand, increasing k amplies
the e¤ect of  on aggregate sales volumes, which determine the transfer from
the government. Even though the sign of this impact depends on the demand
elasticity (it calls for a larger value of  if the demand elasticity is smaller
than one), equation (12) shows that the rst impact is always larger than
the second, so that () decreases with k.
Increasing the tax rate  also has two similar impacts. First, it in-
creases the sensitivity of type s expenditure to , calling for a smaller
most-preferred value of . Second, it a¤ects the sensitivity of the sales values
to . As with k, the sign of this second impact depends upon the value of
the demand elasticity. When demand is inelastic (1=  1), both e¤ects
reinforce each other and call for a smaller (). Straightforward but tedious
manipulations of (12) show that () decreases with  for most (but not all)
values  and distributions of  even when 1= > 1.11
It is interesting to observe how the equilibrium fraction of sales evaded
is a¤ected by these variables. Recalling that e =  (1  ) =k, we obtain the
following Corollary to Proposition 5:
Corollary 1 Assume that individual utilities are isoelastic. The fraction
of sales evaded at the majority chosen and the optimal enforcement levels
depends neither upon the marginal cost c nor the number of rms n: The
fraction of sales evaded at both enforcement levels always decreases with the
ine¢ ciency of the evasion technology k, and increases with the tax rate 
when the demand elasticity 1= is lower than one.
The comparative statics results of c, n and  on the fraction of sales
evaded are straightforward given their impact on ^ and opt. The impact
of k is more convoluted, since a larger k decreases e for a given , but also
decreases () which leads to a larger e. We obtain that the direct impact of
k on e is larger than the indirect impact through (), leading to a smaller
fraction of sales evaded when k increases.
We now move to the impact of two elements which a¤ect both the identity
of the decisive individuals (med and/or M) together with their preferences
11Three inequalities must be simultaneously satised to have @()=@ > 0 : the rst
two are given by (17) in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix and guarantee that
0 < () < 1, while the third one,  + 2((=M )1=   2) > 0 (where  = 1 + 1=);
guarantees that the derivative of (12) with respect to  is positive. It is far from easy to
nd parameters that satisfy these three equations simultaneously.
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for , namely the price elasticity of the demand function, 1=, and the taste
distribution function F . The demand elasticity decreases the impact of  on
G through the variation in the value of actual sales, calling for a lower value
of opt. The intuition for this result is reminiscent of the Ramsey argument
for the setting of indirect taxes: increasing  raises the e¤ective tax rate paid
by rms, which is more detrimental to welfare when the tax base is very
elastic. The impact of the demand elasticity 1= on the majority chosen
enforcement level ^ is more complex, although the identity of the decisive
type med is not a¤ected by 1=. This is due to the fact that increasing the
demand elasticity has a second e¤ect beyond the one identied above when
med 6= M , namely to a¤ect type meds expenditures. Since the sign of this
impact is ambiguous, we can not sign the impact of 1= over the majority
chosen enforcement level. We resort to numerical simulations based on the
following assumption.
Assumption 1: The taste parameter  is distributed according to a
Beta(a; b) function over [0,2] with (a = 2, b 2 [2; 5]); (a 2 [2; 5]; b = 2) and
 2 [1=2; 3=2]: Observe that the density is symmetric when a = b, and that
its degree of skewness increases with b and decreases with a. Skewness is
positive when a < b and negative when a > b.
Under Assumption 1, we obtain that markets with a larger demand elas-
ticity exhibit lower equilibrium enforcement levels (and thus a larger fraction
of taxes evaded). We also obtain numerically that M increases with the elas-
ticity, so that the ratio med=M decreases (since med is not a¤ected by 1=).
This means that, other things being equal, the majority-chosen enforcement
level will be too large (resp., too small) from a welfarist viewpoint in markets
with a high (resp., low) demand elasticity.
We nally study the impact of the taste distribution F on the enforce-
ment level. As for the majority chosen enforcement level ^, it depends upon
the quotient med/M , where both terms are a¤ected by F (observe from (16)
in the Appendix that the whole distribution matters, and not only the com-
parison of the median with the average willingness to pay). Using numerical
simulations based on Assumption 1, we obtain that med=M decreases with
the skewness of the taste distribution, so that the majority chosen enforce-
ment level increases. This is intuitive since an increase in the skewness means
that a larger mass of individuals have low values of . Those individuals buy
less of the good, while receiving the same lump sum transfer as the others.
They are then less sensitive to an enforcement-induced increase of the con-
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sumer price of the good and thus favor a higher value of the enforcement
level. Since the optimal enforcement level is not a¤ected by the skewness
of the distribution (see equation (12) with  = M), we also obtain that
the majority chosen enforcement level is larger (resp., smaller) than optimal
in markets where the skewness of the taste parameter distribution is large
(resp., low).
We summarize those results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Assume that individual utilities are isoelastic and that the
distribution of the taste parameter  follows Assumption 1. The demand price
elasticity decreases both the majority chosen and the optimal enforcement
levels. The majority chosen enforcement level is larger than optimal if the
demand elasticity is large enough. The skewness of the distribution function
F does not a¤ect the optimal enforcement level but increases its majority
chosen level, which becomes larger than optimal when the skewness is large
enough.
The impact of both the demand elasticity and the skewness of F on the
fraction of sales evaded is straightforward, since neither appears directly in
e =  (1  ) =k. We then obtain the testable implications that the demand
elasticity increases the equilibrium fraction of sales tax evaded, while the
skewness of the taste distribution decreases it (provided that preferences are
isoleastic and satisfy Assumption 1).
Propositions 5 and 6 allow us to shed light on the characteristics of mar-
kets where the enforcement level is low, either in absolute term or compared
with its optimal utilitarian level. Consider separate markets, with the same
tax rate set exogenously across markets, but with the enforcement level cho-
sen separately on each market. Neither the degree of competition on each
market (as measured by the number of rms) nor the rmse¢ ciency (mea-
sured by their marginal cost) does explain di¤erences in (majority chosen
or optimum) enforcement levels. A low majority chosen enforcement level
can result from a large concealment cost (in which case the fraction of taxes
evaded will also be low), a small demand elasticity or a low degree of skewness
of the taste distribution. The latter two cases also characterize the markets
where the majority chosen enforcement level is lower than optimal. Finally, if
tax rates vary exogenously across markets12 that are otherwise similar, then
12This is frequent in Europe, where most countries apply a reduced (circa 5%) VAT rate
for certain goods. This is also the case in many US states, with sales tax rates varying
across products.
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Proposition 5 suggests a negative correlation between tax rate and (majority
chosen or optimal) enforcement levels (provided that the demand elasticity
is low enough).
We stress that all these results assume that the tax rate  is a parameter
of the model i.e., that it is set at an exogenous level before the beginning
of the game. We now endogenize the choice of  as well.
6 Simultaneous voting
We now turn to the simultaneous determination of both the tax rate  and the
enforcement level  by majority voting. It is well known that a Condorcet
winner (i.e., a pair ( ; ) preferred by a majority of voters to any other
pair) often fails to exist when voting simultaneously on more than one policy
dimension.
In the context of our model, where voters di¤er according to only one
dimension (the intensity of their preference for the good, measured by the
parameter ), a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a Condorcet winning
pair ( ; ) is that utilities satisfy the Intermediate Preferences property.
Denition: Preferences are called intermediate if they can be expressed
as
V (;  ; ) = J( ; ) +K()H( ; );
where K() is monotone in  and where the functions J( ; ) and H( ; ) do
not depend on .
When preferences are intermediate, the Condorcet winning pair ( ; )
corresponds to the preferred pair of the individual with the median willing-
ness to pay for the good, med (see Grandmont (1978), Persson and Tabellini
(2000)).
In order to check whether preferences are intermediate, we keep the isoe-
lastic formulation. Starting with the indirect utility function
V (;  ; ) = w   pq(p) + u(q(p)) +G;
where p and G are functions of  and  and replacing q(p) by its explicit
expression, we obtain
V (;  ; ) = w   p


p
1=
+ 
(=p)(1 )=
1   +G
= w + p
 1
 
1


1   +G:
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Clearly, preferences are intermediate, with K() = 
1
 
1  ; H( ; ) = p
 1

and J( ; ) = G.13 We then have proved that14
Proposition 7 With isoelastic utilities, a Condorcet winning pair ( ; ) ex-
ists and corresponds to the preferred pair of the individual with  = med:
We now compute the expression for the most-preferred pair of type ,
denoted by ( (); ()). We show in the appendix that the most-preferred
pair ( (); ()) of an individual of type  is given by
(i) () = 1;
(ii)  () =
1 


M
1=
1=
: (13)
The striking result is that all individuals prefer full enforcement when
they set both the enforcement level and the tax rate simultaneously. The
intuition for this result is that less-than-full enforcement is costly for con-
sumers, because it generates tax evasion by rms, and in order to conceal
this evasion rms have to incur a cost which is increasing with the amount
evaded. Part of this cost is in turn passed through to the price of the good.
If voters can control both the tax rate and the enforcement level, they set
the e¤ective tax rate at their most-preferred level while ensuring that rms
minimize costs by not evading. This is in stark contrast with the situation
which obtains when voters only control the enforcement level and allow for
evasion as a way to decrease the e¤ective tax rate faced by rms.
As a consequence, the formula for   depends only on parameters related
to the demand or to the distribution of types, and not to parameters related
to evasion, such as the concealment cost k. The most-preferred tax rate
decreases with  for the same reason that  decreases with : consumers
with a larger taste for the good consume more of it and are more a¤ected
13It is straightforward that adding a constant w to the utility of each individual is
immaterial when voting upon  and .
14An intuitive explanation for the existence of a Condorcet winner is that politicians
cannot appeal simultaneously to disconnected subsets of the voterstype space, as those
types who prefer low enforcement also prefer a low tax rate. Thus, given any two distinct
platforms, there would be a cuto¤ such that all voter types below the cuto¤ prefer the one
candidate, and all types above prefer his opponent. We thank the referee for suggesting
this explanation.
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by the price increase which follows from an increase in either the tax rate or
the enforcement level.
From Proposition 7, we obtain that simultaneous majority voting results
in full enforcement together with a tax rate given by (13) where  = med.
The majority chosen value of  is positive provided that the demand of the
individual with the median willingness to pay is lower than the average de-
mand i.e., (med=M)
1= < 1. In the special case of logarithmic utilities
(unitary demand elasticity), M = : Hence, the majority chosen value of
 is positive in that case if med <  i.e., if the distribution of willingness
to pay is positively skewed. More generally, numerical simulations (follow-
ing Assumption 1) suggest that a more positively skewed distribution of 
increases  (med). The impact of the demand elasticity is more di¢ cult to
assess, since it a¤ects both the numerator and the denominator of  . Nu-
merical simulations suggest that increasing the demand elasticity 1= results
in a larger value of  (med):
The analysis contained in section 4 shows that a utilitarian social planner
maximizes the utility of type M . Applied to (13), we then obtain that
the social optimal setting of both  and  results in a zero tax rate. As
in this model there is no revenue requirement for the government, the only
reason for a social planner to introduce indirect taxation is to benet the
average consumer with the lump sum transfer.15 But the introduction of
indirect taxation (starting from  = 0) only has second-order e¤ects. These
correspond to the rst and the third term inside the bracket in equation (20)
where med is replaced by M . These two e¤ects have the same magnitude
when  = 0: the increase in the lump sum transfer received is equal to the
increase in the expenditures of the individual with the average demand.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 With isoelastic utilities, if both the tax rate and the enforce-
ment level are set simultaneously, we obtain that
(i) full enforcement is both optimal and chosen by majority voting,
(ii) the optimal tax rate is zero,
(iii) the majority-chosen tax rate is positive if the median type has a lower
than average demand.
15Recall that our denition of welfare does not include prots. If it were, this would be
a further reason not to introduce indirect taxation, since prots are decreasing in  with
isoleastic demands.
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Before concluding, we mention various extensions to our model, and how
they would a¤ect our results.
7 Extensions
In this section, we come back to three main assumptions of the model (indi-
viduals di¤er in tastes, prots are not distributed to consumers and there is
a single consumption good which is taxed) and we mention how our results
depend on these assumptions.
We have adopted the industrial organization approach where voters di¤er
in taste rather than the public economics approach where people di¤er in in-
come. We could reformulate this paper and have income di¤erences replace
taste heterogeneity, provided that we move away from quasi-linear prefer-
ences to a demand increasing monotonically with income. The main results
of our positive analysis above would remain unchanged, with the majority
chosen enforcement level increasing with the skewness of the income distrib-
ution.16 This result is reminiscent of the literature on the political economy
of income taxation, which nds that the equilibrium tax rate increases with
the gap between median and average income. Unfortunately, this testable
implication has by and large been refuted by the empirical literature. More-
over, this approach would not allow us to compare markets inside the same
country.
We now discuss the assumption that prots are only distributed to non-
residents. If prots were distributed to residents, they would be incorporated
into the objective of the utilitarian planner. With the isoelastic demands
introduced in section 5, a larger enforcement level always decreases rms
prots. Therefore, at the value opt that we identify above, the derivative of
the average welfare would be negative. This in turn means that, provided the
planners objective is concave, the socially optimal enforcement level is lower
than opt previously identied. While the optimal enforcement level does not
depend on the identity of the citizens who own the shares, the majority-
chosen level does depend on the precise distribution of prots among voters.
If the set of voting citizens who own shares of the rms is of zero measure,
the analysis contained in section 3.3 remains unchanged, and Proposition 4
is easily modied, with more cases in which the majority-chosen enforcement
16The optimal determination of the enforcement level would be inuenced by a redis-
tributive motive and would di¤er from section 4.
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level is larger than the socially optimal one. If the set of capitalists has posi-
tive measure, the previous analysis does not hold since individual preferences
generically do not satisfy the single-crossing property anymore.
In order to deal with this issue, we have to introduce a second dimen-
sion of heterogeneity among voters, namely the fraction of rmsprots that
each one is entitled to. The simplest way to proceed consists in grouping ex-
ogenously consumers according to the proportion of rmss shares (and thus
prots) that they own i.e., to consider a setting where the second dimension
of heterogeneity takes a nite set of values. In that case, De Donder (2010)
shows that, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet winning enforcement
level exists, but that the decisive voter is no longer the individual with the
median taste for the good in the whole society. Since any consumer owning
a positive share of rmsprots has a lower preference for tax enforcement
than if he owned no share, the Condorcet winning enforcement level can not
be larger than when the set of consumers who own rmsshares has zero
measure. A more precise statement would require specic assumptions on
how prots are distributed and would essentially be a numerical exercise that
we leave for future research.
Finally, we have concentrated here on a single market. This allows us to
assess which variables determine the extent of the enforcement level on this
generic market. Another approach would consist in modelling several inter-
acting markets from the outset. Doing so would however seriously complicate
the analysis. Indeed, individualsdemand for each good generally depends
on other goods prices and thus other goods enforcement levels. As a result,
the price cost margin as given by the right-hand side of equation (4) would
no longer be constant since the elasticity of demand in a particular market
would depend upon the enforcement level adopted in every markets. Our
general results however still hold if the elasticity of demand in a particular
market is independent of other goodsprices. Our general results are still
valid with I interacting markets if (i) preferences can be represented by CES
utility functions of the form u (q) = q where q =
PI
i q

i
1=
and (ii) I is
large enough. In this case, as shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the elas-
ticity of demand in the market of good i only depends upon  and equation
(4) is still valid, with  being a constant.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has started from the observation that the enforcement of indirect
taxation varies across countries and across markets. In order to explain the
determinants of tax enforcement, we build a model where individuals vote
over the enforcement level anticipating how the market equilibrium is a¤ected
by their choice. As we want to explain the emergence of low equilibrium
enforcement, we bias the model in favor of enforcement by assuming that tax
audits are costless and perfect (i.e., that they always reveal correctly whether
a rm has cheated or not, and how much). Voters di¤er in their willingness
to pay for the taxed good and face the following trade-o¤: more enforcement
increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the good sold
in an imperfectly competitive market.
Our focus is the enforcement level so that we assume in most of the paper
that the tax rate is set at an exogenous level. We show that there exists a
Condorcet winning enforcement level i.e., an enforcement level preferred by
a majority of voters to any other enforcement level. This level corresponds to
the one most-preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay.
We show that this level is a¤ected neither by the structure of the market
(the number of rms) nor by rmsmarginal cost. Interestingly, this means
that our analysis remains valid whether we consider a perfectly competitive
market, a monopoly, or any Cournot situation in between. We show that
the majority-chosen enforcement level decreases with the resource cost of tax
evasion (i.e., the resources that an evading rm has to employ in order to
prevent the tax administration from discovering the cheating even without
audits, through a simple cursory examination), and with the value of the tax
rate. We also study how the demand elasticity and the distribution of the
willingness to pay a¤ect the equilibrium enforcement level.
In the last section of the paper, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming
that individuals vote simultaneously over enforcement level and tax rate. We
prove the existence of a Condorcet winning pair of tax rate and enforcement
level. This existence result is interesting by itself since simultaneous voting
over two dimensions typically fails to generate any Condorcet winner. The
reason why such a winner exists in our setting is that individuals di¤er on
only one dimension (their willingness to pay for the taxed good) in such
a way that the conicts between them in the two-dimensional policy space
can e¤ectively be reduced to a single dimension. We obtain that, when the
tax rate is optimized at the same time as the enforcement level, there is
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full enforcement at the equilibrium, in the sense that no rm evades any
tax. In other words, it never pays to let rms evade when both the tax
rate and the enforcement level can be simultaneously optimized, because one
instrument dominates the other. Of course, this result of full compliance
would generalize to maximal compliance if audits were costly or imperfect.
For instance, if audits were costly, the equilibrium enforcement level would
balance only monetary costs and benet from audits.
Our main conclusion regarding the existence of markets with low enforce-
ment of indirect taxation is then that this observation crucially depends on
the fact that tax rates are not optimized separately on each market. Indeed,
in any given country, one observes a very limited number of di¤erent tax
rates. If tax rates were voted upon or optimized separately on each market,
our model predicts that the equilibrium enforcement level on each market
would be maximum.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the inverse demand curve, we have
@p
@
= p0 (Q)
X
i
@qi
@
Recall that optimal individual production decisions are given by the following
rst-order condition
[1   e   g(e)] [p (Q) + p0 (Q) qi ]| {z } = c
(qi;)
:
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
@qi
@
=   @ (qi; ) =@
@ (qi; ) =@qi
As @ (qi; ) =@qi < 0 by the second-order condition, we have
sign(@qi=@) = sign (@ (qi; ) =@) :
25
Di¤erentiating  (qi; ) with respect to  yields
@ (qi; )
@
=  e [p + p0 (Q) qi ] < 0
because p + p0 (Q) qi > 0. Hence @p
=@ > 0
9.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The rst-order condition for the optimal tax enforcement level opt is
@W
@
=  p0()Q(p) +G0() = 0:
Measuring the derivative of welfare at b, we obtain that
@W(^)
@
=  p0(^)Q(p(^)) +G0(^)
so that
@W(^)
@
S 0 i¤Q(p(^)) R qmed((p(^))):
Since individual demand is continuously increasing in , and since we have a
unitary mass of consumers, we denote by M the individual with the average
demand at p(^)
qM (p(^)) = Q
(p(^)):
If we assume that the second-order condition
G00()  [p0()]2 @q(p
)
@p
  p00()q(p) < 0 (14)
is satised for all values of  (including for M), we obtain that the function
W is concave in , and thus that the proposition holds
9.3 Isoelastic demand
With the specication (10), individual demands are of the form
q =


p
1=
;
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Aggregate demand amounts to
Q (p) =

M
p
1=
; (15)
where
M =
Z
1=f () d

: (16)
Observe that, with the isoelastic specication, the identity of the individual
with the average demand depends only upon the demand elasticity and the
distribution of tastes, but not upon the level of enforcement. As before,
e =  (1  ) =k: Therefore, at the second stage, the equilibrium price p is
given by
p =
~c
1  
n
;
where ~c is given by (5) and can be expressed as
~c =
c
1   + 2(1 )2
2k
:
The second-order condition for individual prot-maximization in the Cournot
stage is satised provided 1= > 1=n. For the monopoly case, this is the well
known condition that elasticity should be larger than one. As the number of
rms increases, the range of admissible values of elasticities increases.
9.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Let us rewrite b as
b = 1 
vuutk h(med=M)1= +    2i
(  1)  2 :
where  = (1 + 1=)  1. For an interior solution, the following inequality
must hold
(  1)  2
k
   > (med=M)1=   2 >  : (17)
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Straightforward di¤erentiation of b with respect to  leads to
@b
@
=
1
2
vuut (  1)  2
k
h
(med=M)
1= +    2
i :k
h
 + 2

(med=M)
1=   2
i
(  1)  3
So that
sign
 
@b
@
!
= sign

 + 2

(med=M)
1=   2

: (18)
Multiplying both sides of the rst inequality in (17) by 2 and rearranging,
one gets
 + 2

(med=M)
1=   2

< 2
(  1)
k
 2    = 

2
(  1)
k
   

which is negative when   1; k  1 and  < 1. Hence, by equation (18),
@b=@ < 0
9.5 Most-preferred pair ( ; )
The rst-order condition for an interior preferred value of  is given by
epQ(p)
"
2 + (1  1=) ~c
c
 e   ~c
c


M
1=#
= 0; (19)
while the condition for  is
pQ(p)(1  e(1  ))
"
1  2e(1  )
1  e(1  ) + (1  1=)
~c
c
 e   ~c
c


M
1=#
= 0:
(20)
(i) From the rst-order condition for an optimal value of  (equation
(20)), we have that
~c
c


M
1=
=
1  2e(1  )
1  e(1  ) + (1  1=)
~c
c
(1  e(1  ))  :
Substituting this expression into the rst-order condition (19), we obtain
@V (^(); )
@
= peQ

2 + (1  1=) ~c
c
 e   1  2e
(1  )
1  e(1  )   (1  e
(1  ))  (1  1=) ~c
c

:
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Simplifying and rearranging yields
@V (^(); )
@
= peQ

1 +
e(1  )
1  e(1  )

> 0:
So, at the optimum,  = 1.
(ii) When   is positive,  = 1 and thus e = 0: Plugging this in (20)
and rearranging yields
pQ(p)
"
1 + (1  1=) 
1    
1
1  


M
1=#
= 0:
From this expression, we obtain the explicit solution
  =
1 


M
1=
1=
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